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IF WAR IS EVERYWHERE, THEN MUST THE LAW BE
NOWHERE?
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt*
ABSTRACT

This response focuses on one of the most difficult questions posed by Rosa
Brooks's How Everything Became War and the MilitaryBecame Everything: How
should the erosion of the war / peace dichotomy impact the justifications for the
use of lethal force by the United States government and what, if any, role is there
for law in this context? While Brooks is unambiguously critical of Bush
administration legal policies that asserted expansive executive war powers, she is
less certain about the Obama administration's own reliance on the war paradigm to
justify its targeted killing policies. While describing these policies as "undermining
the international rule of law," Brooks declines to take a firm stance on whether
they are lawful or unlawful, and she rejects the views of critics who would "jam
war back into its old box." It is a credit to Brooks that she is willing to
acknowledge such ambivalence, but her approach comes at a cost. It is difficult to
maintain a critical stance on governmental policy while simultaneously
undermining the very legal foundations that most plausibly support that stance. In
this way, critique quickly turns into apology.

Professor Rosa Brooks has written a compelling, insightful, and accessible
book' that draws upon her experiences inside and outside government to explore
the global and national security challenges of the early twenty-first century. The
central theme-that war and peace have become blurred and are becoming more
so-has purchase over many contexts that Brooks masterfully explores. In this
response, I focus on one of the most difficult-and, I believe, unansweredquestions posed by Brooks's book: How should the erosion of the war-peace
dichotomy impact the justifications for the use of lethal force by the United States
government and what, if any, role is there for law in this context?

This essay was first prepared for a book roundtable co-hosted by the Institute for International
Law and PublicPolicy at Temple University Beasley School ofLaw and the National Constitution
Center on September 15, 2017. The essays from this roundtable have been published as a
symposium collection within issue 32.1 of the Temple International & Comparative Law Journal.
* Professor, Pace University School of Law. I am grateful to Peter Spiro and Temple Law School
for hosting the roundtable on Rosa Brooks's probing book, and to Rosa Brooks and the other
roundtable participants for the enriching discussion. Many thanks also to Kyle Loder and the
other editors of the Temple International& ComparativeLaw Journal for their help in publishing
this response.
1. RoSA BROOKS, How EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND
EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE PENTAGON (2016).
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As a matter of existing legal frameworks, questions of war and peace have
tremendous importance for the justification of killing. The norm against murder is
one of the most fundamental rules of human society. The basic rule is that
killing-whether conducted by law enforcement officials or private citizens-is
prohibited in all except very few strictly defined circumstances, such as when
imminently necessary to prevent the infliction of death or serious bodily injury by
an unlawful aggressor or when necessary to prevent the escape of a dangerous
fleeing felon. In wartime, as Brooks explains, the rule is quite different and far less
protective of human life. Pursuant to international humanitarian law (IHL), enemy
combatants may be targeted-with limited restrictions-based on their status,
irrespective of the threat they may or may not pose at the particular time. In many
cases, the law also permits the knowing killing of civilians so long as those deaths
are incidental to a strike directed against a military objective. We think of these
wartime rules as the exception-and even within that sphere IHL raises many legal
and moral challenges-but if we have lost our ability to distinguish between war
and peace such that "everything" is war, then the legal and moral implications are
quite severe.
One can, of course, write about this question without normative
commitments. Much of the book's contribution lies in Brooks's sociological
observations about our contemporary moment and where it may be leading, but she
also imbues her narrative with a moral urgency that assigns critical importance to
human rights and the rule of law. For instance, when she confronts various Bush
administration legal policies, Brooks responds with unhesitating condemnation.
The claim that detainees in the war on terror lacked protection under the Geneva
Conventions was, Brooks argues, "surely wrongheaded in a strategic and moral
sense," although she allows that the legal reasoning (which she analogizes to the
game of tennis) played by the rules, "though perhaps pushing the boundaries a
bit."2 Worse yet was the government's defense of waterboarding against
accusations of torture. Those government arguments, she maintains, play the game
of legal reasoning but are tantamount to cheating, relying as they do "on selective
3
and misleading citations and odd logical leaps." Then there were the Bush
administration claims to sweeping executive power which, Brooks maintains,
abandoned the rule-of-law game entirely, inspiring her to offer this ominous
caution: "If we create a legal system in which cheating is widespread-or, worse,
if we overlook game-ending moves by those with power and treat them as
legitimate modifications of the game-then it isn't merely the rules that get bent,
4
but the rule of law itself."
Brooks, however, appears less confident about how to apply this taxonomy to
the sometimes controversial arguments championed by the Obama administration
in which she served. The book opens with a personal anecdote about the
authorization of a drone strike against a man allegedly involved in various terrorist

2. Id. at 201.

3. Id.
4. Id. at 202.
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plots.' The narrative hints at moral disquiet but draws no firm legal conclusions.
Elsewhere, Brooks appears more explicitly critical. She emphasizes, but still
ambiguously, that U.S. policy is "undermining the international rule of law,"6 and
she maintains that,
U.S. drone strikes present not an issue of lawbreaking, but of law's
brokenness: sustained U.S. assaults on the meaning of core legal
concepts have left international law on the use of armed force not merely
vague or ambiguous but effectively indeterminate, eroding law's value as
a predictor of state conduct and a means of holding states accountable.'
This last statement is noteworthy for how it parallels Brooks's
aforementioned description of the Bush administration's game ending claims to
unbounded executive power." In the drone context, Brooks is less decisive: the
government has not actually violated the law because, she claims, the law itself is
broken." I am not sure why that conclusion follows, nor am I convinced that the
law is as broken in this area as Brooks maintains. Consider the following
possibilities.
One can argue-as critics have-that the U.S. targeted killing policy exceeds
the limits on permissible lethal force imposed by international law. ' The problem
might be that the United States has defined war too broadly to justify lethal force
against groups whom, properly understood, it is not actually at war. It might be
that the United States has violated international law by pursuing attacks against
non-state actors with whom it is at war within the territory of states with whom it is
not permissibly at war. It might be that the United States has violated IHL-and
even committed war crimes-by targeting persons who, properly understood, are
neither combatants nor civilians directly participating in hostilities and, hence, are
not permissible targets. It might be that the United States has failed to adequately
consider nonlethal means or that its strikes have claimed excessive incidental
civilian casualties." If Brooks agrees with any of these-or any other-possible
legal objections, then it is reasonable to argue, as she does, that U.S. policy has
undermined the rule of law. But the most natural way to put the point would be to
observe that the United States has undermined the rule of law by repeatedly
breaking the law, much in the same way that the Bush administration undermined
the rule against torture by authorizing and engaging in torture. If indeed U.S. drone
strikes reflect "sustained U.S. assaults on the meaning of core legal concepts,"l2
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 3-4.
Id at 284.
Id. at 290.
BROOKS, supra note 1, at 201-02.
Id at 290.
See, e.g., UnitedStates ofAmerica: 'TargetedKilling'Policies Violate the Right to Life,
AMNESTY INT'L 5 (2012), https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/usa targeted killing.pdf.
11. In forthcoming work, I have explored the question of whether IHL imposes a legal duty
to consider nonlethal means. See Alexander Greenawalt, TargetedCapture, 59 HARV. INT'L L.J.
(forthcoming 2018).
12. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 290.
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why resist concluding that the government has violated the law?
Perhaps, one might object, this comparison is off the mark because there is a
greater legal and/or moral justification for the U.S. targeted killing policies than
there was for the waterboarding of suspected terrorists. One important distinction
is that, unlike torture, IHL permits the killing of combatants in wartime. On this
point, Brooks observes that "the available evidence suggests that drone strikes
cause far fewer unintended casualties than other types of strikes."" In cases of
armed conflict where a drone strike against a military target reduces the threat to
civilians in comparison to alternate means of achieving the same military
advantage, the law may indeed demand that choice.
The troubling aspect of drone strikes, then, has less to do with whether they
are ever allowed, but rather when they are allowed. On this score, Brooks is
particularly concerned with the government's expansive approach to self-defense,
which justifies particular targeted killings by equating the concept of "imminent
threat" with "lack of evidence of the absence of imminent threat."" If indeed, she
observes, it is enough that "any terror suspect might be about to unleash another
catastrophic attack on the scale of 9/11," then the putative "limitations on the use
of force establish no limits at all." 6 And the weakness of the international order,
Brooks notes, results in the disturbing situation in which these questions are all
determined by the United States itself as "judge, jury, and executioner all rolled
into one."" But even here, Brooks stops short of blanket condemnation: "However
destabilizing U.S. counterterrorism legal theories are to the rule of law," she
reflects, "they arose in response to real dilemmas-and it is not inconceivable that
their very destabilizing qualities could ultimately help usher in a process of much
needed legal change." To return to Brooks's tennis analogy, it is not clear how we
should evaluate the government's maneuvers. Is the government playing by the
rules? Is it cheating? Has it destroyed the game entirely? Or has it begun the
process of improving a game that is in desperate need of improvement? Brooks's
analysis suggests support for each of these positions.
To illustrate the point, consider one of the legal complications Brooks briefly
highlights. For the purposes of justifying a particular strike, it is important to know
whether "drone strikes [should] be construed legally as a series of discrete uses of
force, each of which must be independently evaluated for adherence to self-defense
principles," or whether "they constitute, in effect, an ongoing use of force made up
The
of many individual strikes, which should be evaluated collectively. .
13. Id. at 111 (emphasis original).
14. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51(5)(b), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (Prohibiting attacks "expected to cause incidental harm to civilians and
civilian objects," when such harm would "be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.").
15. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 287.
16. Id. at 288 (emphasis original).
17. Id at 289.
18. Id at 291.
19. Id at 288-89.
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matter has critical importance for Brooks's own critique because it affects the
framing of the government's self-defense theory. If the government can justify a
particular killing by reference to an already ongoing armed conflict, then its targetby-target self-defense evaluation (with its troubling definition of imminence) may
be unnecessary. In contrast to the Obama administration's policy on strikes outside
the United States and areas of active hostilities, international law does not require
combatants to ensure that a wartime targeted opponent is "a senior operational
leader" who presents a "continuing, imminent threat," or that such a strike carries a
"[n]ear certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed."20 The general
rule in armed conflict, Brooks notes, is that "it's lawful to target enemy combatants
based simply on their status as enemy soldiers."21 Seen against that more
permissive background rule, the U.S. policy offers greater protection than IHL
does, reflecting perhaps the very type of legal innovation that Brooks endorses.
Yet the validity of that perspective hinges on the plausibility of the underlying
claim that the targets of these strikes are indeed combatants engaged in an armed
conflict with the United States, and that their targeting otherwise complies with
international legal restrictions on the conduct of war. If that is not the case, then
U.S. policy reflects an aggressive expansion of the wartime right to kill. As with
the Bush administration torture policy, the government may be cheating at the
game of legal interpretation. It may, indeed, be committing murder.
The tangle of questions at the heart of this debate is too complex to evaluate
in this brief reply, but it is hardly a stranger to the law. To take just one example,
the case law of international criminal legal tribunals has routinely addressed the
existence and classification of armed conflicts in the course of evaluating a
tribunal's jurisdiction over specific criminal defendants. In the case of Prosecutor
v. Bolkoski & Tardulovski, for instance, the Trial Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia determined that the 2001 violence
between Macedonian government forces and the insurgent National Liberation
Army had risen to the level of an armed conflict, a necessary condition of the
prosecution's attempt to establish the perpetration of war crimes. In reaching this
conclusion, the tribunal did not rely on the general claim that war was
"everything," or as Brooks also puts it, that "for all practical purposes, war is
whatever powerful states say it is." 23 Instead, the tribunal applied the international
legal standard dictating that a non-international armed conflict exists when there is
"protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State."2 4 As with much of the law, of
20. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the
Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active
Hostilities
(May
23,
2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism.
21. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 289.
22. See Prosecutor v. Botkoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008).
23. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 218.
24. Bolkoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 175.
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course, that test is hardly self-applying, and will present complications in many
scenarios. It will be necessary, as the Bolkoski court did at great length, to
elaborate upon its requirements, and there will be close and uncertain cases. But
one can acknowledge those caveats without giving up on law's coherence or
authority. The inevitable ambiguities of legal interpretation and application do not
make everything war, nor do they make all legal arguments about war equally

plausible.
In highlighting the legal controversies surrounding drone strikes, Brooks does
not attempt the kind of rigorous analysis that would offer a definitive judgment on
the plausibility of the government's legal claims, and perhaps it is too much to ask
that such a broad-ranging book would do so. At times, Brooks appears skeptical
that the endeavor is even worth attempting. She rejects, for instance, the approach
of human rights and civil rights communities who have tried to "jam war back into
its old box," 25 and she maintains that "few lawyers are good at" having
conversations about "right and wrong, good and evil, fear and hope, cruelty and
26
compassion" that are necessary to "the messy world of policy and morality."
It is a credit to Brooks that she is willing to acknowledge such honest
ambivalence, and her ultimate goal of preserving human rights values in a changed
and complicated world is undeniably both noble and creative. To be sure, her
broad claims are both urgent and compelling. The world has changed and
continues to change in destabilizing and often frightening ways. Government
policy must adapt to these challenges with greater transparency and with an
overarching commitment to rule of law values. But the approach also comes at a
cost. It is difficult to maintain a critical stance on governmental policy while
simultaneously undermining the very legal foundations that most plausibly support
that stance. In this way, critique quickly turns into apology. The risk is that Brooks
may inadvertently advance the very trends she seeks to resist.

25. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 344.
26. Id. at 363.

